Home advantages.
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title: Robust Open Bare-metal Ubiquitous Resilient
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title: Robust Open Bare-metal Ubiquitous Resilient
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author: someone
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author: someone
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---
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---
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At robur, we build performant bespoke minimal operating systems for high-assurance services.
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TODO: vermutlich ist es marketingmaessig klug, folgende features besser zu verkaufen:
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Advantages
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- targeted hypervisors: KVM, ... on amd64 and arm64; Xen on am64 and arm32
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* based on the unikernel pioneer [MirageOS](https://mirage.io)
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- compiles to JavaScript (for single-language web applications)
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* secure implementation guarded against memory corruption, typelevel problems, leaky abstraction and unforseen state
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- high-level memory-safe language allows for quick turnaround cycles during development and feature addition
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* ready for the cloud, services run on all major hypervisors
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- visualisation / comparison of the trusted code base
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* instant boot
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- decent performance
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* competitive performance comparable to C / C++
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- fast boot time
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* can target embedded devices because of small size and the ability to compile to native code
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- several libraries already deployed by others (Docker)
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* minimized state allows to reason about entire systems and their adherence to the specification
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- 'scalable cloud-ready' (cap'n proto, prometheus, ...)
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* extensive library ecosystem, yet minimal trusted code base at runtime
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- small footprint (MB of memory -> lots of per server)
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- could spawn a VM for each user
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- energy efficient (https://sites.google.com/view/energy-efficiency-languages/)
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Computers on the Internet get compromised,
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from scratch with security in mind, directly on the virtualization layer.
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- to access data on the computer (databases, passwords, user accounts) or block
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Each service is a separate virtual machine image with exactly the
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access to it (Ransomware),
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required code, and no need for a multi-purpose operating system kernel.
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- to participate in DoS of other services (e.g. the Mirai botnet on SmartTVs)
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and manipulate opininon (chatbots).
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The software stack is often missing critical security updates, most embedded
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devices (home router, SmartTV, etc.) have no secure update channel, they need a
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secure system from the start.
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Recent security solutions focus on containing compromised software by using
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virtualisation technology and containers. But the root cause remains: running
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old systems that are insecure.
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Instead of trying to fix these decades-old operating systems, which were
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designed as multi-user time sharing systems of the past, we build small services
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from scratch with security in mind, directly on the virtualization layer. In
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our operating system, each service is a separate virtual machine with only the
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required code (usually no need for process- and user management, or a file
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system), and no copy of a multi-purpose operating system kernel.
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This makes our systems much smaller. The binary size of an HTTP server with TLS
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This makes our systems much smaller. The binary size of an HTTP server with TLS
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support in our system is around 4% compared to one in a conventional operating
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support in our system is around 4% compared to one in a conventional operating
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